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Recent military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, the proliferation of violent nonstate actors,
and the rise of ISIS have sparked a debate on the need to create a sixth domain of warfighting, the
human domain. This article builds off of military doctrine and scholarly articles and books to offer
(a) a definition of the human domain and (b) its military objective—building influence to affect
behavior of a target population better than the adversary.
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In 2006, retired General Rupert Smith opened his book The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the
ModernWorld by proclaiming that “war no longer exists,” surmising that state-on-state war is a thing
of the past and present and future wars will be fought largely between nonstate actors (p. 3). In a
similar vein, Mary Kaldor’s book New Wars (2007) argues that the post-Cold War security environ-
ment is defined by “wars among the people,” or wars where states will fight nonstate actors or
nonstate actors will fight each other; these wars, while perhaps not new, will be the dominant form of
warfare and eclipse military engagements between states. Military historian Martin Van Creveld
(1991) makes a similar prediction, attributing the danger of nuclear war to the decline in war between
states and the rise of nonstate actor conflicts. All three scholars purport that conventional warfare is a
thing of the past and military engagements will be punctuated by irregular threats, such as terrorists,
insurgents and violent transnational groups. These scholars agree that these ‘new wars’ require
changes in how and why states engage in military action.
Recent military operations appear to affirm these new dynamics in warfare. The Global War
on Terror, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the rise of ISIS have all involved armed conflict
between state and nonstate actors. These violent engagements have compelled intervening forces
to change not only tactics, techniques and procedures, but also to develop new strategies and
objectives in warfare more broadly. In particular, U.S. and European countries have begun to
debate the need to create a sixth domain of warfighting, the human domain, to be analytically
distinct from the existing domains of warfare (land, sea, air, space, and cyber). In the United
States, for example, a 2012 U.S. Army white paper argues, “the success of future strategic
initiatives and the ability of the U.S. to shape a peaceful and prosperous global environment will
rest more and more on our ability to understand, influence, or exercise control within the ‘human
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domain’” (TRADOC 525-3-0, p. 15). However, the call for a sixth domain of warfare has
sparked considerable debate over its definition, purpose, connection to other domains, and
training requirements for military forces.
This article builds off of doctrine, scholarly articles, books, and media reports, to offer a definition
of the human domain and a defense for creating the human domain as the sixth realm of warfighting
in an era dominated by population centric warfare. The article proposes a military objective in the
human domain, which is influencing an individual or group to affect behavior better than the
adversary. With this objective in mind, the article argues that four broad core competencies are
necessary to understand and influence the human domain within the armed forces: language and
cultural analytics, which is the ability of intervening forces to analyze culture within their area of
operation; communications skills; intelligence capabilities; and skills that prepare the military for
interagency, whole of government, and a “whole of nation” approach.
DEFINING THE HUMAN DOMAIN
One of the challenges of establishing a human domain of warfighting is defining the term and its
scope. Several publications offer definitions of the human domain, with little agreement on what
it is, what it contains, and how it is distinct from the other domains. For example, a 2013
USSOCOM White Paper defines the human domain as follows: “the totality of the physical,
cognitive, cultural, and social environments that influence human behavior” (pp. 4–5). This
definition, while offering a broad foundation upon which to investigate the human domain,
poses a challenge, namely that it conflates what affects humans with the domain itself. The
human domain first should be defined independent of the factors that shape it; then a discussion
on what affects or influences it should be investigated. The 2015 USSOCOM report “Operating
in the Human Domain” offers a more basic definition: “The Human Domain consists of the
people (individuals, groups, and populations) in the environment, including their perceptions,
decision-making, and behavior” (p. 4). This definition, while straightforward, confines the
human domain only to what people think and do, which leaves out other important aspects of
the human domain, such as the material objects and social groups that humans produce.
The 2010 British Joint Doctrine “Understanding” offers a more complex definition of the
human domain, breaking it down into what it is, the environments that affect and are affected by it,
and different types of actors. The doctrine defines the human domain as: “the interaction between
human actors, their activity and their broader environment. It is defined as the totality of the human
sphere of activity or knowledge” (pp. 3-5, emphasis theirs). “Understanding” further delineates the
environments that affect and are affected by the human domain, breaking these down into cultural
(ideological, psychological); institutions (political, military, economic, legal); technological (tech-
nology, cyberspace); and the physical environment, meaning terrain and weather (pp. 3-5 to 3-7).
“Understanding” provides categories of actors, dividing the human domain into state (individual
and group actors aligned with the state); nonstate (individuals and groups independent of the state);
global (actors that have influence at the global level, including organizations such as the United
Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and superpowered individuals); and local
actors—those who have influence at the local level (pp. 3–8). The doctrine is quick to point out
that these categories are not mutually exclusive; individuals and groups could belong to multiple
categories, and affiliations and priorities can change over time.
HUMAN DOMAIN AND INFLUENCE OPERATIONS 93
A June 2013 Small Wars Journal article “Joint Force 2020 and the Human Domain” asserts that
“human factors are the basis for all action within, and interaction between, the various actors in the
physical domain of the battlespace” (Hoffman&Davies, p. 2). The article builds off of the concept of
maneuver in warfighting to propose that humans are their own space of military maneuver. The goal
of intervening militaries and governments is to influence and shape human behavior in targeted
areas: “Our interest in this environment, which cuts across and drives our operational effectiveness in
all other domains, is predicated upon the need to shape the attitudes and behaviors of decision-
makers, individuals, and relevant populations to our desired political outcomes” (p. 4). The article
asserts that the human domain is the foundation of all other domains:
Literally no action can take place in the other physical domains without this vital human element. It is
humans who fly aircraft and apply precision power in the air domain. It is trained professionals who
operate sophisticated surface and subsurface platforms in the sea domain. Cyber professionals operate
and defend our computers, and seek to outwit hackers and intruders in the cyber domain (p. 5).
Building off of these debates, this article proposes the following definition of human domain:
The human domain is comprised of humans—including humans as physical beings, human thought,
emotions, and human action—and what they create, such as groups, infrastructure, art and so on. In other
words, the human domain is what humans are, what they think, how they act, and what they create.
This definition draws from descriptions of the traditional domains of warfighting—land, sea,
air, and space—which include not only the terrain of each domain, but all that is in that terrain as
well. Similarly, the human domain consists of more than just humans as physical beings, but also
their thoughts and perceptions, and the things they make, such as groups, infrastructure,
information, and so on. Furthermore, as will be described, this definition of the human domain
allows for a separate discussion on the military objective of this realm, which is to influence the
target audience to affect behavior better than the adversary.
Each subdivision of the human domain—the physical being, thought, action, and what humans
create—can become a focus of warfare. For example, humans as physical beings have become the
target of extermination campaigns, or genocide, as a wider military strategy. Examples of this
strategy include Armenians duringWorld War I; Jews, Slavs, Roma, homosexuals, and the mentally
and physically challenged in Hitler’s Germany and its allies during World War II; and the Hutu’s
slaughter of the Tutsis in the Rwandan civil war in 1994. In these cases the elimination of these
groups of people—as opposed to targeting them for just psychological effect—was the goal. Rape as
a weapon of war is another strategy that targets humans as physical beings, and aims to wipe out
ethnic groups and destroy communities through mass rape and the offspring they produce (Diken &
Lausten, 2005). On a tactical level, the use of people as a “human shield” to prevent adversaries from
attack is another form of using humans as physical beings in war.
Human thought is also a critical target of warfare. Affecting leaders and their decision making
processes has always been a goal of warfare. In conventional war, state leaders make the
decision to go to war and to capitulate; therefore, ultimately war begins and ends in the minds
of leaders. In more modern times, particularly after the creation of nation-states, populations and
their thoughts have also played a critical role in warfare. The creation of the levee en mass, and
the state’s need for its population’s willingness to participate in warfare to field sufficient troops,
has become a critical calculation in warfare. With the advent of democracy, the ability of citizens
to oust leaders through elections has also created new calculations for going to war and for the
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duration of armed conflict. The greater inclusion of the press in warfare has informed popula-
tions’ perceptions through what is commonly known as the “CNN effect,” which has shaped
popular support for going to war and ongoing military engagements. More recently, social media
has become a powerful tool for mobilizing mass protest, as was evident in the 2010 and 2011
Arab Spring uprisings. All of these factors make shaping human thoughts, perceptions and
emotions, a critical aspect of warfighting today.
Last, what humans make is an important part of the human domain. Humans are creative
beings and constantly developing ways to be more efficient and organized. Humans create
collectives—social, political, ethnic, religious, and occupational based groups—which, in turn,
affect how humans think and behave. Human creations also include tangible objects such as
roads, buildings and other infrastructure. Humans also develop stories, myths, symbols, art, and
other systems of belief that help to explain and make sense of the world. All of these creations
can be powerful tools of warfighting and peace building.
Because the human domain (similar to the other domains of warfare) is extremely broad, it is
useful to break it down into analytical subcategories. Despite the rise of “war among the
people,” states are still the principal unit of political organization in international affairs and
the polity most immediately responsible for working toward internal and transnational war
termination; therefore, subcategories of the human domain should begin with, and relate to,
the state. Here states are defined as physical territory, its government, and the population within
it. States, however, are no longer (or perhaps never were) unitary actors; therefore it is essential
to include the substate level, which contains everything within a state, such as tribes, ethnic
groups, civic associations, religious groups, gangs, and so on. It is also necessary to consider
trans-state actors, good and bad, such as international charities and nongovernmental organiza-
tions as well as criminal and terrorist networks that cross borders. Ethnic and religious groups
can also cross state borders and form their own groups with interests and resources.
A second important consideration within the human domain is leaders and followers and the
dynamic between them. Leaders are powerbrokers; they hold sway over others and therefore are
extremely important to manage in times of potential or actual conflict as well as in efforts to maintain
peace. However, those that follow are also an important consideration and require separate attention
to manage and influence. For example, one of the effects of globalization is that it has dispersed
information to all levels of society around the world, changing power dynamics (Fukuyama, 1999;
Zakaria, 2003). Studying the effects of globalization on the dynamic between leaders and followers
is an important consideration for influence in the human domain.
Building off of the discussion from the British “Understanding” and the USSOCOMWhite Paper
on the human domain, it is important to further consider what affects the human domain. Several
publications aid this discussion. First, Operational Culture for the Warfighter (Salmoni & Holmes-
Eber, 2008) points out that humans affect and are affected by their environment; therefore humans’
relationship to their surroundings is dynamic. Operational Culture proposes a three part dynamic
model for understanding humans and their environment: an “ecological model,” which considers
humans’ relationship to the physical environment; a “social structure model,”which investigates the
social and political systems that humans create and how they affect humans in turn; and a “symbolic
model,” which examines “the beliefs, symbols, and rituals of a group” (Salmoni & Holms-Eber,
2008, pp. 22–24). The authors further relate this three-part dynamic model to war, noting that the
ecological model predicts conflicts over natural resources, such as water, land, and byways; the
social structure includes wars over power in unequal societies; and the symbolic model includes
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conflicts over “identity and ideology between competing social systems” (Salmoni & Holms-Eber,
2008, p. 24).
Two additional dynamic variables help round out what affects the human domain. First, the
authors of Operational Culture include technology under the ecological model, but it is useful to
consider it as its own variable. Technology has changed the way humans engage in warfare and
opened up new domains of warfighting, most recently the space and cyber domains. Moreover,
globalization, brought on by advances in information technologies, has connected people in new
ways, including for conflict. The cyber domain, in particular, has become a new realm of
warfighting that would not exist without innovations in information technologies. Therefore,
technology and its relationship to people is an important consideration in the human domain.
Second, humans’ relationship to information is another important consideration for its
dynamic impact on the human domain. Information, a product of humans, is particularly
important for its ability to shape perceptions. Nineteenth-century scholar of democracy Alex
de Tocqueville (1990) notes that “nothing but a newspaper can drop the same thought into a
thousand minds at the same moment” (p. 111). While clearly technology has allowed for other
means of communications to speak to the masses, the essence of de Tocqueville’s comment
remains unchanged. Information is a valuable tool for shaping beliefs and behavior. More recent
innovations in social media are a continuation of the influencing effects that information
technology has on human thought and behavior. In addition to the spread of information created
by advances in Information Technologies, it is also important to note that “low tech” means of
spreading information is still important today. Rumors, “whisper campaigns,” gossip and word-
of-mouth communications may be particularly important in villages and areas with limited
technology, but is still a facet of modern societies as well (see Table 1).
Last, in this wider discussion of the human domain is the U.S. military’s 2007 creation of the
Human Terrain System, which aimed to provide military commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq
with a better understanding of the populations they were engaging. Defined as “the human
population in the operational environment … as defined and characterized by sociocultural,
anthropologic and ethnographic data and other non-geographical information,” the U.S. military
focused heavily on “mapping” and understanding the human terrain in critical areas of operation
(Kipp, Grau, Prinslow, & Smith, 2006, p. 15).
Although the concept of the Human Terrain System makes sense in conflicts that are
population centric, mapping the human terrain introduces some important problems. First, not
everything in the human terrain can be mapped. Gender and age demographics can be mapped,
but important considerations, such as worldviews, cannot. Thus the danger of mapping the
human terrain is that it will include items that are easy to identify and map, and omit ones that
are not, effectively giving greater importance to these easily measured or visualized
factors. Second, humans are ever-adapting; they change and are changed by their environments.
Mapping the human terrain runs the risk of creating static information that is collected at one
point in time and not rechecked for changes. Even seemingly static factors, such as group
identity or religious affiliation, could change with time.
Rather than map the human terrain, it is better to focus on the military objective in the human
terrain—influence—which will be explored further in the following section.
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THE MILITARY OBJECTIVE OF THE HUMAN DOMAIN—INFLUENCE
The U.S. military defines the objective of the four physical domains of warfighting (land, sea, air
and space) as “dominating” these realms. Dominating the traditional domains of warfare
involves controlling physical space: securing and holding specific territory; controlling sea
lanes of communication; and denying airspace. However, with the creation of the fifth domain
of warfighting in U.S. doctrine, the cyber domain, dominance is no longer defined by controlling
physical space. Unlike land, sea, air, and space, the cyber domain is not physical; despite having
roots in the world, its battlespace is largely virtual and therefore cannot be bounded and
controlled like sea lanes, air space, or specific terrain. Similar to the cyber domain, the human
domain contains challenges for identifying and measuring military objectives.
The military objective in the human domain should be influence, and dominating the human
domain is the ability to influence targeted individuals and groups better than the adversary. A
useful definition of operationalized influence comes from a RAND report on strategic influence
in the Global War on Terror. It builds off of the U.S. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Field
Manual to operationalize influence operations as:
…planned operations—convert and/or overt—to convey selected information and indicators to
foreign audiences. Such campaigns attempt to influence perceptions, cognitions, and behaviors of
foreign governments, organizations, groups and individuals (Cragin & Gerweher, 2005, p. 14).
Influence is critical in the human domain because it holds the potential to shape human thoughts,
actions, and what humans create. If done properly, targeted individuals and groups will align
their attitudes and behavior with U.S. interests. The critical question becomes: how do inter-
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Several scholars offer useful insights into creating influence with a targeted audience. Cialdini
(2006) outlines six principles for building influence: reciprocity (treat others as you wish to be
treated); commitment and consistency (get people involved early on and be persistent); social
proof (create an atmosphere where others are doing same thing and there is safety in numbers);
likability (which builds trust); authority (which also builds trust); and scarcity (things are more
desirable when they are few in number).
The Yale attitudinal change model offers another useful tool for how to build influence in a
target audience. The steps include the following: exposure (the message reaches the audience);
attention (the message can be heard above competing messages and “static”); comprehension
(the message is clear and makes sense culturally); acceptance (the audience understands and
accepts the model); retention (the message is durable); and translation (the message changes
thinking, which leads to changes in behavior). The model’s creators are quick to note that these
steps are sequential and therefore must be performed in this order to successfully build influence
(Cragin & Gerweher, 2005, pp. 22–24; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953).
Also useful for a discussion on influence in the human domain, the RAND study on strategic
influence presents a spectrum of influence that ranges from compliance to conversion.
Compliance is summarized as “believe what you want but do as we say” (Cragin &
Gerweher, 2005, p. 15). For compliance to occur, the instructions need to “(1) have sufficient
inducement; (2) few or no obstacles to obedience; and (3) a simple set of instructions to follow”
(Cragin & Gerweher, 2005, p. 16). The report further notes that compliance campaigns are
usually immediate in effect but they rarely result in changes in belief; therefore the effect
requires constant reinforcement or is short lived. The threat or use of force is a useful tool in
compliance campaigns (Cragin & Gerweher, 2005, p. 16).
In the middle of the spectrum is conformity, which can be summarized as peer pressure, or
individuals measuring their behavior and beliefs to others around them and conforming to the
group. Conformity campaigns can be built around normative influence, or building uniformity in
peer beliefs and behavior. Another means of building a conformity campaign is through
information, which can shape behavior and beliefs (Cragin & Gerweher, 2005, p. 17).
On the right end of the spectrum is conversion, which is “the complete restructuring of the
audiences’ relevant beliefs, attitudes, emotions and opinions” (Cragin & Gerweher, 2005, p. 19).
The goal in conversion is still to alter behavior, but to do so by changing the underlying beliefs
that guide actions. Conversion campaigns require a strong degree of control over the environ-
ment, sufficient knowledge of the target audience, and time. The influencer is also trusted
(Cragin & Gerweher, 2005, p. 19–20).
Cialdini’s six principles, the Yale Six Step sequence, and the RAND spectrum of compliance,
conformity and conversion suggest a few important considerations for building influence in the
human domain. First, it is important to know what desired effect the intervening power would
like from its targeted individual or population. This is perhaps the most critical piece of
information for influence in the human domain. If the intervening authority wants specific
actions and is limited by time, then coercion to achieve compliance may be the best course of
action. However, if the intervening power wants to create lasting influence with a group, state,
region, or their leaders, the literature suggests that this will take time and building relationships
and trust are paramount. The use of force under these circumstances, if not balanced within the
wider objective of building lasting influence, may be counterproductive.
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Second, these models suggest that the goal of influence is to change behavior, but the means
through which to do that differ. Compliance campaigns change behaviors without changing beliefs,
conformity changes behaviors subconsciously through environmental cues, and conversion changes
behavior through changing beliefs. With conformity and especially conversion, changes in behavior
should be long-lasting (if not permanent) because the social cues and beliefs that govern behavior
have been changed; therefore change may take longer, but it lasts longer as well.
Third, changing behavior alone in the human domain is an attainable goal for an intervening
military, especially through the threat or use of force. However, transforming underlying beliefs
with the goal of lasting change in behavior will most likely require a whole of government
approach. Incentives or “inducements” could come in the form of aid, trade agreements, military
advising, or other forms of influence, which require different agencies in the government—not just
the military—all working together toward the same goal. A “whole of nation” approach, which
includes not just the instruments of government power but also a nation’s population, its private
sector, and its independent associations, could also provide useful resources for long term efforts
aimed at building relationships and credibility between states. For example, during the Cold War,
the United States used academic exchanges, music tours, art, and literature to help promote
U.S. and democratic values around the world and blunt communist ideology (Gregg, 2010). The
wide array of government and national resources offer a much broader spectrum of resources for
shaping beliefs and influencing the behavior of targeted audiences in the human domain.
Fourth, in most cases, influence campaigns aimed at doing more than temporary change take
time and consistent effort. It is unrealistic for the intervening force to expect to build a credible
and trusting relationship—requirements for lasting influence—without the investment of time
and consistent interaction with the targeted individual or group. Furthermore, the use of force for
near term influence may be counterproductive to a long term relationship of trust and influence.
Therefore, the intervening government and military may need to make tradeoff calculations in
short versus long term desires for changing behavior in the human domain (see Figure 1).
MILITARY RESOURCES FOR BUILDING INFLUENCE
If building influence to change behavior is the objective in the human domain, what resources do
intervening militaries have to create this change? Perhaps the principal role of any military in the
modern era is to act as a deterrent against aggression toward its homeland and its interests.
Deterrence is prima face a form of influence; its goal is to shape adversarial behavior. A
country’s deterrent capability is largely a tool of compliance; it creates a credible threat of the
use of force for adversaries with the aim of changing behavior. As the RAND model suggests,
compliance is usually quick, but constant pressure is needed to keep the adversary behaving in a
specific way. However, as also noted by the RAND report, compliance could be counter-
productive if a more lasting and trusting relationship is desired.
Militaries also have useful resources for a conformity campaign, although this form of
influence requires a better understanding of the target audience and a subtler hand than with
compliance. Perhaps one of the most useful tools of a country’s military is resources aimed at
shaping and spreading information. Information Operations and PSYOP, if properly employed,
could help create instructions that shape behavior. As previously noted, conformity campaigns
require several ingredients. As with all influence campaigns, intervening forces need to know the
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type of behavior it wants from its target audience to create and effective program. Second, all
forms of messaging from various agencies in the government need to be sending the same
message to prevent confusion and reduce “static.” The message must also make sense culturally.
Furthermore, the messenger needs to be trusted. In countries where intervening powers are not
trusted, it may be preferable and even necessary to work through messengers on the ground to
shape behavior. The threat of force may play a role in conformity campaigns, but its role would
be significantly subtler than with compliance campaigns.
Conversion campaigns require the most work and time, but also promise to have the most
lasting effect; as with conformity campaigns, a whole of government and maybe even a whole of
nation approach is needed to sustain a consistent message and offer a range of inducements to
build relationships and trust between states. Furthermore, conversion campaigns are more likely
to be effective if begun before a crisis emerges as part of “shaping operations”, or what is also
called “Phase Zero,” “Left of Phase Zero,” or “Grey Zone” operations. Influence campaigns that
are begun before crises allow for influence and trust to build without the added urgency of
immediate military action.
Perhaps one of the most useful resources in a conversion campaign available to the military is
military-to-military engagements with target countries. Joint military exercises communicate an
ongoing relationship and commitment with the target country on several levels: it trains the
target nation’s military in tactics and other useful military skills; it provides personal contact
between the partnering power and target nation troops; it builds persistent relationships between
both nations’ senior officers, who jointly conduct planning and execution of the exercise; and,
from a messaging standpoint, coverage of the exercise informs the target nation’s population of
the partnering nation’s commitment to those countries.
Another resource for building lasting influence is military training and advising; both con-
ventional and Special Operations Forces have an important role to play in developing influence
and shaping behavior through this form of military contact. Training and advising provide the
opportunity to build relationships through sharing information, tactics and experience. The
ultimate goal with military advising, however, should be to build trust between participating
forces and to work toward partnership. Drawing from Cialdini, the Yale Six Step Model and the
RAND spectrum of influence, in order for this form of influence to be effective, the interaction
Identify desired 








Leverage social and 
environmental cues (requires 
coopting local messengers, 
difficult to control)
Build relationships (time 
intensive but creates 
lasting inducements)
FIGURE 1 Three paths of influence to change behavior.
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should be consistent and long lasting—preferably the same troops returning to the same areas—
which shows commitment and helps build trust. If the target audience trusts the messenger, then
the message is more likely to be embraced and the desired behavior adopted.
In addition to training and advising, Special Operations Forces have other valuable resources
for influencing the human domain. In the U.S. military, for example, Army Civil Affairs could
shape operations and provide influence within local governments and society through projects
aimed at addressing these groups’ needs and vulnerabilities. Similarly, U.S. PSYOP is a
potentially valuable source of influence through messaging to target audiences. Taken together,
U.S. Civil Affairs, with its focus on local governments and civil society, and U.S. PSYOP with
its messaging resources should work in concert with other Special Operations Forces to provide
a holistic approach to influencing a target group and its leaders.
Other sources of influence include exchanges to military schools, as well as officer exchanges
with partner nations’ schools. Academic exchanges allow for prolonged, concentrated time of
interaction between officers. These exchanges also allow for officers to experience their host
nation’s culture over the period of a year or more.
CORE CAPABILITIES FOR INFLUENCING THE HUMAN DOMAIN
The article concludes by proposing four core capabilities militaries need to better understand and
influence the human domain and shape conventional and irregular threats: language and cultural
skills, communications capabilities, intelligence that focuses both on populations and the
adversary, and preparing the military for a whole of government and nation approach.
Language and Cultural Skills
Considerable attention has been paid to the need for language and cultural skills in order to
influence target groups, leaders, and regions. In 2005, the Department of Defense released the
“Defense Language Transformation Roadmap,” which aims to identify language and cultural
skills necessary for addressing threats in the post-September 11 security environment. The report
identifies four goals for language and cultural training:
Create foundational language and cultural expertise in the officer, civilian, and enlisted ranks for
both Active and Reserve Components; Create the capacity to surge language and cultural resources
beyond these foundational and in-house capabilities; Establish a cadre of language specialists
possessing a level 3/3/3 ability (reading/listening/speaking ability); Establish a process to track the
accession, separation and promotion rates of language professionals and Foreign Area Officers
(FAOs) (U.S. Department of Defense, 2005, p. 1).
These goals clearly prioritize language training as necessary for influencing and shaping
behavior in the human domain. The report further names a desired outcome “the total force
understands and values the tactical, operational, and strategic asset inherent in regional expertise
and language” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2005, p. 4).
Cultural and regional competency appears to be less emphasized than language skills. There
is reason to suggest that basic skills in analyzing culture and society, what could be called
“cultural analytics”, may be more attainable and also highly useful for influencing and shaping
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behavior than language proficiency. Cultural analytics differs from teaching troops about a
specific group’s culture, such as its history, religion, famous leaders and so on, which is often
dated, static and relies more on what others say about a group’s culture than what it says about
itself. Instead, cultural analytics teaches skills that allow troops to analyze for themselves their
target audience’s social, political, economic, and belief systems, and how these aspects of culture
could be leveraged for influence operations. Moreover, this approach also equips troops to
analyze changes in beliefs and behavior introduced by their operations and whether or not they
are having the desired effect.
The concept of cultural analytics is echoed in both the Cialdini principles and the Yale Six Step
model, which stress the importance of understanding one’s target audience in order to effectively
influence it. Operational Culture for the Warfighter also emphasizes this approach, particularly the
importance of being able to analyze culture as a social phenomenon, and the dynamics between
people and their environment, their social groups, and they symbols in order to effectively engage
and influence people in an area of operation (Salmoni & Holmes-Eber, 2008, pp. 15–27). Cultural
analytics, in other words, gives troops skills that allow them to assess their surroundings and better
understand the values, beliefs, needs and vulnerabilities of the groups that they are engaging. This
point is further elucidated in the 2013 U.S. report “Operational Relevance of Behavioral and Social
Sciences to DoDMissions,” in which the authors consider the wide range of military operations and
missions, spanning from deterrence to stability operations, that require knowledge in social and
behavioral sciences, and the need to train troops in the ability to assess culture and a dynamic and
changing factor (Flynn et al., 2013).
Another core competency required for influencing the human domain is developing tools that
engage all aspects of society, including men, women, and even children. The U.S. Army, Marine
Corps, and Special Operations Forces have experimented with creating teams of female troops
aimed at engaging women in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom across
a range of missions. One key finding from the deployment of these teams is that female troops
were often regarded as “a third gender” that could engage both local men and women in
Afghanistan (U.S. Marine Corps I Marine Expeditionary Force, 2010, p. 8). Ultimately, influen-
cing the human domain will be a difficult endeavor if only half the population is accessible to
intervening forces.
Communications Skills
A separate, but perhaps equally important, core competency for forces attempting to exercise
influence the human domain is communications skills. Whereas cultural competency and
analytics include knowledge and tools for assessing groups—including their values, social
organization, needs, and vulnerabilities—communications skills involve applying cultural
knowledge to effectively interact with target populations. Two broad communications core
competencies are highlighted here: listening and negotiating.
Listening is a critical capability for influence operations. Cultural awareness and analytics are
of little value if intervening forces cannot receive the messages that target groups are sending. In
other words, intervening forces need adequate listening skills to comprehend the people they are
attempting to influence. Listening skills go beyond hearing what people are saying to include
nonverbal cues and other signals.
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One approach to teaching listening skills to intervening forces is Brownell’s H.U.R.I.E.R.
model: Hearing, focusing on and attending to the message; Understanding, obtaining the literal
message’s meaning; Remembering, recalling the message for future action; Interpreting, expres-
sing sensitivity to contextual and nonverbal message aspects; Evaluating, logic applied to the
assessment of the message value; Responding, choosing an appropriate response to what is heard
(Brownell, 2005). Regardless of the model employed, listening skills are a necessary compe-
tency for intervening troops to understand their operating environment in the human domain.
Another useful capability for influence operations in the human domain is negotiation skills.
Negotiation skills combine listening, comprehension, communication, patience, and iterative
interaction aimed at conflict resolution, knowledge transfer and compromise. Numerous models
exist for different types of negotiation for different purposes, derived largely from business
management and law (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1992; Nadler, Thompson, & Van Boven, 2003).
Negotiation skills would be particularly useful for engaging leadership in the human domain,
both friendly and adversarial.
Intelligence
A third major core competency for influencing the human domain is intelligence. The 2006 U.S.
Counterinsurgency Manual FM 3-24 devotes an entire chapter to intelligence gathering in
counterinsurgency; it begins by stating: “Counterinsurgency (COIN) is an intelligence-driven
endeavor.” The chapter goes on to assert that “the function of intelligence in COIN is to facilitate
understanding of the operational environment, with emphasis on the populous, host nation, and
insurgents” (p. 3-1). The importance of intelligence is reiterated in the 2014 updated manual
(FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5, 2014, p. 8-1).
Military intelligence collection from the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
and the International Security Assistance Force underwent considerable scrutiny during the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, the controversial 2010 U.S. report “Fixing Intel,” which
focused specifically on intelligence gathering in Afghanistan, argues the following:
… because the United States has focused the overwhelming majority of collection efforts and
analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, our intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to
answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate and the people we are
trying to protect and persuade (Flynn, Pottinger, & Batchelor, 2010, p. 4).
“Fixing Intel” offers a comprehensive approach to gathering intelligence for influence
operations in the human domain. However, this approach to intelligence collection, data
management, and analysis is significantly different from the way intelligence has historically
been structured and its purpose in traditional warfare, including a stronger focus on the
population (as opposed to enemy forces), the relation between nonstate actors and the popula-
tion, and possible points of influence with the population, as opposed to a country’s enemy
forces. In other words, this approach to intelligence gathering would require significant changes
in selecting, training, structuring, managing and reporting of intelligence. It is unclear whether
this new approach to gathering and analyzing intelligence would work for traditional state-on-
state warfare as well.
Although “Fixing Intel” stresses the importance of better understanding the populous in
Irregular Warfare, comprehending the adversary is still a critical function of intelligence.
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Leadership targeting, in particular, is important in the human domain. The U.S. Government and
military have made kinetic leadership targeting one of its priorities in the Global War on Terror
and, more recently, in the fight against ISIS. Intelligence gathering and analysis should also
focus on nonkinetic means of influencing leadership, both with friendly and adversarial leaders.
Leadership profiling was done during the Cold War and remains invaluable for understanding
specific leaders and how to influence them (Mitrovich, 2000). Intelligence topics for nonkinetic
leadership targeting could include which leaders to include in negotiations and which to isolate
and why.
Preparing the Military for a Whole of Government and Nation Approach
The human domain of warfighting requires a whole of government and even a whole of nation
approach. As the 2010 U.S. Joint Operating Concept: Irregular Warfare points out, to maximize
the likelihood of success, joint forces must adopt collaborative frameworks and work closely
with government, international, host nation governments, and indigenous organizations to
understand and account for the population and operating environment. This understanding
requires better knowledge of, and collaboration with, various stake holders within a country,
and between countries’ agencies more broadly. Moreover, greater emphasis should be placed on
better understanding and coordination with international organizations, such as the United
Nations, and regional organizations such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Domestic and international nongovernmental organiza-
tions are also key stakeholders in population centric conflict and warfare, and can no longer be
dismissed as insignificant or subordinate. This myriad of actors undoubtedly complicates
operations and coordination; however, they are part of the landscape of “new wars”; therefore
efforts to better coordinate with these various actors to influence targeted individuals, groups and
society with the human domain is time well spent for any country and its military forces.
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